

Contra Molinism

Terms: (p) = actual world (n) = number of people who freely believe
G = known by God O = actualizable for an omnipotent being
A = actualized

1. $\diamond(p) \rightarrow \diamond O(p)$ 1. If (p) is possible, then it is possible for an omnipotent being to actualize it.
2. $\diamond(p)$ 2. (p) is possible.
3. $\diamond O(p)$ 3. Therefore, it is possible for an omnipotent being to actualize (p).

1. $A(p) \rightarrow (n)$ 1. If (p) is actualized, then (n)# of people will freely believe in God.
2. $(n) \rightarrow G(n)$ 2. If (n)# of people will freely believe in God, then the fact of (n) will be known by God.
3. $A(p) \rightarrow G(n)$ 3. Therefore, if (p) is actualized, then the fact of (n) will be known by God.

1. $N[A(p) \rightarrow (n)]$ 1. God knows that if he were to actualize (p), then (n)# of people will freely believe in God.
2. $A(p)$ 2. God actualized (p).
3. (n) 3. Therefore (n)# of people will freely believe in God.

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Prior to Actualizing (p) where (p) is the actual world where (x) is the finite number of the *specific* people who freely believe equal to 50% of humans:

1. (p) is logically possible.
2. In (p), (x) number of *specific* people freely believe.
3. God knows that if (p) was actualized, then (x) number of *specific* people will freely believe.

God actualized (p) and thus exactly (x) number of *specific* people freely believe.
Our human freedom is accounted for as a fact *of* (p) and thus does not alter (x).


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Prior to Actualizing (w) where (w) is a logically possible world where (n) is the finite number of the *specific* people who freely believe equal to 100% of humans:

1. (w) is logically possible.
2. In (w), (n) number of *specific* people freely believe.
3. God knows that if (w) was actualized, then (n) number of *specific* people will freely believe.

God actualized (w) and thus exactly (n) number of *specific* people freely believe.
Our human freedom is accounted for as a fact *of* (w) and thus does not alter (n).

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If free choice is already part of what God knows in (p) such that it does not affect the number of those who freely believe in (p), then what metaphysically changes when the variable number of freely believing is increased such that what God foreknows about our free choice is not accounted for and after actualizing (w) would make free choice undermine what God foreknew, thus making it infeasible, as Molinists claim:

